The Drivers of Sound Defense
When future historians look back on this decade, they likely will ask why, at a time when dangers to the security and interests of the United States were numerous and growing, the President and Congress chose to cut defense spending so deeply and for so long.
Current U.S. law is imposing “sequestration”-level cuts to the Pentagon that are cumulatively slashing over $450 billion from projected spending on national defense over a ten-year period—and that’s in addition to another $500 billion reduction.(1) Yet, as America’s servicemen and servicewomen today prepare for yet another year of cuts to military spending, they are being tasked to safeguard our nation amid a world that is becoming not less but more unpredictable and dangerous, as illustrated by recent events:
- In March 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin upended America’s and NATO’s planning assumptions in Central and Eastern Europe when Russia militarily occupied and illegally annexed Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula.(2)
- In November 2013, the People’s Republic of China stunned the Indo-Pacific when it imposed, unilaterally and with no prior consultation, an expansive air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea that extends over contested islands controlled and administered by Japan, a treaty ally of the United States.(3)
- In August 2013, Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad blatantly defied President Obama’s “red line” when his regime’s military forces used chemical weapons in large-scale attacks against civilians and anti-Assad rebels in the suburbs of Damascus.(4)
In short, a worrisome gap has emerged between the resources that the U.S. military needs to carry out its global responsibilities and the resources it is getting. Unless policymakers and lawmakers in Washington cooperate to narrow this divide, it will only grow in the years to come—and, with it, the risks to the security and interests of the United States. However, doing so will require the President and Congress to make hard choices, and advance a new agenda for renewing America’s defenses—one that moves away from the current approach to national security that’s driven by budgetary politics, and toward a more prudent approach driven by strategy.
Dollars, not sense
The story of the shortfall between the U.S. military’s available resources and global responsibilities begins in Washington. Since January 2009, the Defense Department has endured four distinct rounds of multiyear cuts to its regular annual budget. While controversy has surrounded these successive spending reductions, strategic foresight largely motivated the first two rounds of cuts. However, the same cannot be said of the second two rounds of reductions, which were driven by near-sighted budgetary politics.
The first round of cuts took place in 2009, when then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates capped or cancelled over 30 programs intended to replace or modernize weapon systems, saving over $300 billion in projected Pentagon spending over five years.(5) The next round took place in 2010, when Gates initiated a drive to cut waste and improve efficiency, with the aim of saving another $78 billion over a five-year period.(6) As Gates later explained in his memoir, he had negotiated a deal with the White House for much of these savings to be reinvested in the Pentagon to fund more important strategic priorities.(7)
The next two rounds of cuts, however, overturned Gates’s deal with the White House, and were driven neither by strategy nor by thoughtful analysis, but rather by bare-knuckle politics. In August 2011, the White House and Capitol Hill agreed to the Budget Control Act, a political deal to raise the U.S. debt limit that ended up cutting nearly $500 billion from a decade’s worth of spending on national defense as projected by the President’s Budget for FY 2012.(8) In March 2013, after President Obama and Congress failed to meet a legally-mandated deadline for enacting deep reductions to the federal deficit, the Budget Control Act imposed lowered caps on discretionary spending—in effect forcing nearly $450 billion in cuts to projected spending on national defense between FY 2013 and FY 2021.(9) What’s more, any failure to meet these new ceilings on defense spending would automatically trigger a legally-mandated “sequestration” that would indiscriminately cleave the Pentagon’s annual budget and other national defense programs to meet these caps.
While the President and Congress have agreed to minor adjustments to the multiyear cuts contained in the Budget Control Act, these forced reductions have set in motion a process that is cumulatively slashing nearly $1 trillion in nominal dollars from a decade’s worth of spending on national defense. (See figure 1.) The financial impact of these cuts becomes even more apparent when projections of long-term defense spending account for inflation. (See figure 2.) In real-dollar terms, sequestration-level cuts significantly reduced defense spending in FY 2013 and are keeping it arbitrarily flat into the next decade.
In any given year, the Pentagon consumes roughly 95 percent of U.S. spending on national defense. Under the revised $521 billion budget cap for national defense in FY 2015 (which begins in October 2014), the Pentagon now plans to spend $496 billion on its regular annual budget—roughly $45 billion below what the Obama administration had planned for FY 2015 in April 2013, and a whopping $95 billion below what had been planned for FY 2015 in February 2011. In macroeconomic terms, the Pentagon’s regular annual budget is set to fall from nearly 3.7 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) when President Obama entered office in 2009 to just 2.8 percent today. That’s roughly the same percentage of GDP that America spent prior to al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks.
In turn, successive rounds of cuts are forcing the Pentagon to base its plans for current and future military forces not on strategic prudence, but on the imprudence of budgetary politics. To understand why this is not just inadequate but also potentially dangerous, it’s helpful to look at where the military ought to be and then compare it both to where it actually is today—and to where, under continued sequestration-level cuts, it is headed.
In 2010, the congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, a bipartisan body chaired by former National Security Advisor Stephen J. Hadley and former Defense Secretary William J. Perry, recommended that—in the absence of a strategy-driven force-planning construct—our military should “be sized, at a minimum, at the end strength outlined in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR)”(10). Initiated by the Clinton administration’s Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, amid the U.S. military’s post-Cold War drawdown, the 1993 Bottom-Up Review established a baseline force structure that was intended to allow the United States to fight and win “two nearly-simultaneous major regional contingencies.”(11) Table 1 summarizes the size of the armed forces and personnel outlined by the Bottom-Up Review.
Although the 2010 QDR Independent Panel endorsed this baseline as a minimum, the panel’s co-chairman, Stephen Hadley, told Congress that the Pentagon performed the 1993 Bottom-Up Review at a time “when we thought the world was going to be much more benign than it turned out to be."(12) Since then, it has only become less benign.
For the foreseeable future, the United States faces three main classes of threats: (1) terrorism and other violent extremism; (2) the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other game-changing technologies; and (3) the return of great-power rivalries.
Terrorism and Violent Extremism
Al-Qaeda’s surprise attacks on 9/11 overturned America’s state-centric view of the international threat environment. They underscored how a small but fanatical group of violent extremists can exploit and use a democracy’s openness and infrastructure against itself to kill civilians and inflict disproportionately large amounts of damage. The post-9/11 threat of al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups prompted the United States not only to play tougher defense to secure the homeland, but also to go on the offensive and combat terror networks on foreign soil. For more than a decade since, a U.S.-led coalition of allies and partners has undertaken a sustained effort to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and associated forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, in the Middle East and North Africa, in Southeast Asia, and elsewhere.
But while U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts have achieved considerable success in hunting down al-Qaeda’s core leadership—most notably with the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in May 2011—the threat of al-Qaeda has evolved into a complex network of geographically-dispersed affiliates and associated movements.(13) As the American Enterprise Institute’s Katie Zimmerman observed in a September 2013 study, “Al Qaeda affiliates have evolved and now threaten the United States as much as (if not more than) the core group; they can no longer be dismissed as mere local al Qaeda franchises.”(14) Key parts of the broader al-Qaeda network pose grave dangers to the U.S. homeland and overseas interests.
But while the broader al-Qaeda network poses the most immediate set of threats to the United States and its overseas interests, U.S. officials still worry that al-Qaeda’s core someday could try to mount a comeback. As Director of National Intelligence Clapper told Senate lawmakers in January 2014, “Sustained counterterrorism (CT) pressure, key organizational setbacks, and the emergence of other power centers of the global violent extremist movement have put core al-Qa’ida on a downward trajectory since 2008.” But he warned that al-Qaeda’s core “probably hopes for a resurgence following the drawdown of US troops in Afghanistan in 2014.”(15)
While the threat of terrorism and violent extremism is growing and evolving, America’s resolve to combat these threats overseas may be waning. A month after U.S. Navy SEALs hunted down and killed al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, President Obama went on television to tell the American public that we can “take comfort in knowing that the tide of war is receding.” He tellingly added: “America, it is time to focus on nation building here at home.”(16) The emergence of a broader network of al-Qaeda affiliates in the Middle East, Southwest Asia, and Africa counsels vigilance, not complacency, in counterterrorism efforts.
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Other Game-Changers
The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other game-changing technologies pose a severe challenge to the United States. While it’s not uncommon in Washington to hear the cliché that the spread of destructive military technologies is inevitable, the cliché misses the point. For decades, the United States has used its various instruments of national power—diplomacy, economic pressure, and military force—to help slow how fast and how far nuclear weapons and other technologies of mass destruction diffuse internationally.
Today, two rogue nations with nuclear ambitions—namely, North Korea and Iran—pose particularly difficult challenges to U.S. national security strategy. While North Korea detonated a nuclear explosive device in October 2006 after repeatedly violating its international nonproliferation obligations, Iran, which appears to be running North Korea’s playbook for nuclear proliferation, is refusing to comply fully with its international obligations as it preserves and expands capability to make a nuclear weapon on rapid notice.(17)
Although the United States and international partners have used a decade’s worth of diplomacy and economic pressure to persuade Iran to halt its drive to nuclear weapons-making capability,(18) Iran only agreed to a six-month interim nuclear deal to slow its sensitive nuclear activities in late November 2013.(19) While the controversial interim deal requires Washington and its partners to begin dismantling the international sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program, it does not require Tehran to dismantle a single centrifuge, to ship out of the country a single kilogram of enriched uranium, or to begin dismantling a heavy-water reactor at Arak. Rather, the interim deal only requires Iran to take reversible steps to decrease its stockpile of near-high enriched uranium, while allowing it to continue to produce low-enriched uranium so long as new stocks are converted into an oxide form that creates an additional hurdle for further enrichment.
While the six-month interim nuclear deal is intended to create space for negotiations on a comprehensive Iranian nuclear agreement, it is uncertain whether the United States and other world powers will find sufficient common ground with Iran for such an agreement. Indeed, it appears that Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other U.S. allies and partners in the Middle East are concerned that the interim nuclear deal has already ceded too much diplomatic ground to Iran. What is clear, however, is that a nuclear-armed Iran would make an already-volatile Middle East potentially unmanageable for the United States, especially if Iran’s nuclear breakout were to lead Saudi Arabia or other nations in the region to go nuclear as well.
The Return of Great-Power Rivalries
The third major category of national security threats facing America is the oldest one in the Westphalian international system: great-power rivalries. But while most attention has focused on the rising strategic contest between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, recent developments in Eastern Europe signal the potential return of a high-stakes geopolitical competition between Washington and Moscow.
Russia’s military occupation and illegal annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea in March 2014 followed the popular ousting of Kremlin-friendly Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych. Of course, this is not the first time that post-Soviet Russia has invaded the territory of a state in Central and Eastern Europe—the Russian military fought the Georgian military to occupy the country’s breakaway provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, prompting a political crisis between the Bush administration and the government of then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.(20) But while Georgia and Russia, both under pressure from the United States and the European Union, managed to sign an uneasy truce that capped tensions, however tentatively, within days of the crisis’s start, relations between Moscow and Kyiv today remain tense more than a month after the start of the Russo-Ukrainian crisis.
At the time of this writing, the Russian military has massed anywhere from 40,000-to-100,000 troops near the Ukrainian border, and it is uncertain whether President Vladimir Putin will order Russian forces to seize portions of eastern Ukraine—or, as some fear, sprint directly to Ukraine’s capital of Kyiv.(21) What is clear, however, is that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has upended more than two decades of America’s and NATO’s planning assumptions about Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, Michael McFaul, a principal architect of President Obama’s ill-fated “reset” policy who served as the U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation until February 2014, conceded in a March 2014 op-ed in the New York Times that “the decision by President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia to annex Crimea ended the post-Cold War era in Europe.”(22)
Russia is causing problems on other fronts as well. Senior U.S. officials told NATO allies earlier this year about Russia’s suspected violations of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987, a Cold War-era pact that bans Washington and Moscow from testing, producing, and possessing medium-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads.(23) U.S. officials believe that Russia, as early as 2008, repeatedly tested ground-launched cruise missiles that run counter to the INF Treaty. They also believe that the Kremlin has tested intercontinental-range ballistic missiles at medium-range distances in an effort to go around the 1987 agreement’s limitations. The Obama administration, however, has refused so far to refer formally to Russia’s missile tests as “violations” of the INF Treaty, pending the outcome of an ongoing review process with Moscow.
The People’s Republic of China poses the greatest potential long-term challenge to the security and interests of the United States and its allies. While China still must overcome key internal and structural challenges to complete its rise, it nonetheless has translated several decades of economic growth into military might and geopolitical gains.(24)
In terms of geopolitics, China has become more assertive, especially in advancing its maritime and geopolitical claims. To cite a recent example, in late November 2011, Beijing declared, unilaterally and with no prior international consultation, an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea that extends over the Senkaku Islands, territory which Japan administratively controls but which the Chinese also claim.(25) Reports in January 2014 that China might also seek to declare an ADIZ in the South China Sea led to a flurry of protests from senior officials in the Obama administration. Senior officials in the Chinese military also reportedly said that establishing a second ADIZ over the South China Sea would be in the country’s interest.(26) However, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Danny Russel recently told House lawmakers that “[a]ny Chinese claim to maritime rights not based on claimed land features [in the South China Sea] would be inconsistent with international law.”(27) It remains to be seen whether or not Beijing will renew efforts to challenge the status quo in its maritime and territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific.
Toward a strategy-driven defense
The President and Congress will have no chance to reverse our military’s crisis in readiness and modernization unless the United States allows strategy, rather than raw budgetary politics, to drive defense. With every year of deep cuts to defense, the U.S. military’s force structure moves further away from the standard established by the 1993 Bottom-Up Review. To move towards a strategy-driven defense that is able to meet all three classes of threats facing the United States—namely, terrorism and other violent extremism, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other game-changing technologies, and the return of great-power rivalries—decisionmakers in the Executive and Legislative Branch should concentrate on:
- Reversing planned cuts to military personnel of the Army and Marine Corps. In particular, the Army should be sized at no less than the numbers proposed by the 1993 Bottom-Up Review.
- Growing the Navy’s rate of shipbuilding. To the extent possible, the Defense Department should move rapidly toward a Navy with 346 ships, as recommended by the bipartisan 2010 QDR Independent Review Panel.
- Recapitalizing the Air Force. China, Russia, and other countries continue to develop offensive and defensive air capabilities that require the United States to strengthen investments in both the quantity and quality of the Air Force.
- Fully modernizing U.S. strategic nuclear forces. As China grows its inventory of nuclear warheads, ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, it is placing growing strains on America’s extended deterrence over Japan, the Republic of Korea, and other U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific. It is therefore imprudent to cut U.S. strategic nuclear forces below the limits of the New START Treaty, certainly in the absence of any further treaty-based caps on both Russian and Chinese nuclear forces. Rather, the United States should renew efforts to fully modernize both its warheads and delivery vehicles, as the Obama administration had promised to do in return for the Senate’s advice and consent on the New START Treaty.
- Fully modernizing space assets. As our military relies more and more on space assets for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), foreign competitors are developing capabilities to capitalize on the vulnerabilities of our space assets. It is critical that our military modernize our space assets to improve their resiliency against potential adversary attempts to disrupt, degrade or destroy them.
- Fully funding plans for cyberdefense. China, Russia, Iran, Syria, and other countries are improving capabilities for cyberwarfare. It is critical that the United States maintain a preeminent position in the cyber domain, with capabilities to prevent and defend against cyber attacks, and to identify and retaliate against cyber attackers.
Back to basics
Rebuilding America’s military will require several years of concerted effort with a clear strategic plan. Certainly, this task will largely fall to the next president. However, President Obama and the 114th Congress can dramatically improve the fiscal environment for the military by finding additional reductions in the federal budget to offset the sequester imposed by the Budget Control Act of 2011. Unless and until the threat of sequestration is permanently lifted from the military, America’s defenses cannot begin to be rehabilitated.
The United States, as leader of the Free World, has vital interests that span the globe—freedom of trade and navigation worldwide, including: keeping open the Strait of Hormuz and Suez Canal; peaceful resolution of maritime and territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific region; fulfillment of our obligations to allies and partners, including defending the right of Israel to exist and the right of Taiwan to decide its own destiny; deterring nuclear or conventional adventurism by North Korea or China; preventing Iran from getting rapid nuclear weapons-making capability; and vigorously combating and countering al-Qaeda and associated forces, as well as other terrorist groups that seek to harm the United States or its allies. We cannot defend these interests without a foundation of hard power that is sized and shaped to protect America’s national security and international interests, rather than to meet arbitrary budget numbers.
As Robert Gates counseled in a high-profile speech in his final days as Secretary of Defense, “The ultimate guarantee against the success of aggressors, dictators, and terrorists in the 21st century, as in the 20th, is hard power—the size, strength, and global reach of the United States military.”(28) Our leaders forget this hard-fought lesson at the peril of our nation.
Robert Zarate is policy director of the Foreign Policy Initiative (FPI), a non-partisan, nonprofit organization in Washington, D.C. From 2009 to 2011, he served as legislative assistant on national security affairs to Congressman Jeff Fortenberry (R-NE). In 2009, he served as a legislative fellow on the Democratic staff of the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade.
1. For the U.S. laws that impose these deep cuts to defense spending, see The Budget Control Act of 2011, Public Law 112-25, 125 Stat. 240, enacted August 2, 2011, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112s365enr/pdf/BILLS-112s365enr.pdf; The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Public Law 122-240, 126 Stat. 2313, enacted January 2, 2013, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-112publ240/pdf/PLAW-112publ240.pdf; and, Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, Public Law 113-67, 127 Stat. 1165, enacted December 26, 2013, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-113publ67/pdf/PLAW-113publ67.pdf.
2. For a penetrating analysis of America’s and NATO’s flawed planning assumptions—and how to fix them—see Edward Lucas, A. Wess Mitchell, et al., Central European Security After Crimea: The Case for Strengthening NATO’s Eastern Defenses, Center for European Policy Analysis Report no. 35, March 25, 2014, http://www.cepa.org/content/case-strengthening-natos-eastern-defenses.
3. See “China Maps out Its First Air Defense ID Zone,” Xinhua, November 24, 2013, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2013-11/24/content_4476197.htm.
4. For President Obama’s declaration of a “red line” on the use of chemical weapons in Syria, see White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President to the White House Press Corps,” August 20, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/20/remarks-president-.... One year and one day later, the Assad regime launched a large-scale chemical weapons attack in the Damascus suburbs, according to the Obama administration. See White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Government Assessment of the Syrian Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013,” August 30, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/30/government-assessm....
5. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, “Speech at the American Enterprise Institute (Defense Spending),” May 24, 2011, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1570.
6. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, “Statement on Department Budget and Efficiencies,” January 6, 2011, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1527.
8. U.S. Department of Defense, “Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request,” February 2012, 4, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2013/FY2....
9. See Todd Harrison, “Defense Funding in the Budget Control Act of 2011,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis, August 2011, esp. 3-4, http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2011/08/defense-funding-in-the-bu....
10. The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s National Security Needs in the 21st Century, Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, United States Institute of Peace, 2010, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/qdr/qdrreport.pdf.
12. See Hadley’s question-and-answer exchange with Senator Joseph I. Lieberman (ID-CT) in The Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, hearing before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 111th Congress, 2nd Session, August 3, 2010, 19, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg64136/pdf/CHRG-111shrg64136.pdf.
13. Katie Zimmerman, “The Al Qaeda Network: A New Framework for Defining the Enemy,” American Enterprise Institute, September 2013, http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/pdf_upload/analysis/Z.... For an excellent visual depiction of the structure of the geographically-dispersed al-Qaeda network, see figure 5 on page 21.
15. Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper, Statement for the Record to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 29, 2014, http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Intelligence%20Reports/2014%20WWTA%20....
16. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President on the Way Forward in Afghanistan,” June 22, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/22/remarks-president-....
17. For a discussion of North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear proliferation efforts, see Robert Zarate, “The Non-Use and Abuse of Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence in the Cases of North Korea and Iran,” draft paper, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, April 8, 2013, http://nuclearpolicy101.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/The-Non-Use-and-A....
18. For an overview, see Robert Zarate and Patrick Christy, “FPI Fact Sheet: Timeline on Diplomacy and Pressure on Iran’s Nuclear Program (UPDATED),” Foreign Policy Initiative, March 17, 2014, http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/timeline-diplomacy-and-pressure-ir....
19. Joint Plan of Action, a non-binding interim agreement among Iran, United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China, November 24, 2013, http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131124_03_en.pdf.
20. For contemporaneous news coverage, see Neil MacFarquhar and Thom Shanker, “Russian Neighbors Urge U.N. to Stand Against Kremlin Aggression,” New York Times, September 24, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/25/world/europe/25nations.html.
21. See Eli Lake, “U.S. Won’t Share Invasion Intel with Ukraine,” Daily Beast, April 8, 2014, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/04/08/exclusive-u-s-won-t-sha....
22. Michael A. McFaul, “Confronting Putin’s Russia,” New York Times, March 23, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/24/opinion/confronting-putins-russia.html.
23. See Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Says Russia Tested Missile, Despite Treaty,” New York Times, January 29, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/30/world/europe/us-says-russia-tested-mis.... See also Josh Rogin, “U.S. Knew Russia Violated Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty,” Daily Beast, November 26, 2013, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/11/26/u-s-knew-russia-violate....
24. See Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, “China’s S-Shaped Threat,” Diplomat, September 6, 2011, http://thediplomat.com/2011/09/chinas-s-shaped-threat/?allpages=yes, and Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2013, Annual Report to Congress, May 2013, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_China_Report_FINAL.pdf.
26. Minnie Chan and Reuters, “Southern Air Defense Zone ‘Crucial for China in Long Term,’ PLA Expert Says,” South China Morning Post, February 22, 2014, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1432938/southern-air-defence-zone....
27. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel, Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, February 5, 2014, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA05/20140205/101715/HHRG-113-FA05-Wst....
28. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Remarks at Notre Dame University, Notre Dame, Indiana, May 22, 2011, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1568.